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Automatic Antecedents of
Discrimination
Jenny Roth,1 Roland Deutsch,1 and Jeffrey W. Sherman2
1Department of Psychology, University of Würzburg, Germany
2Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA
Abstract: In increasingly diverse societies, discrimination against social groups and their members continues to be a public and political
concern. Research has addressed three basic cognitive processes that precede discrimination: categorization, stereotype/prejudice activation,
and stereotype/prejudice application, suggesting that these processes occur in an automatic fashion. However, there are multiple components
of automaticity, including unawareness, efficiency, unintentionality, and uncontrollability. Most of the previous research implies that these
components of automaticity converge with respect to cognitive antecedents of discrimination. Here, we review evidence on the distinct
components of automaticity in order to assess whether (a) categorization, (b) stereotype/prejudice activation, and (c) stereotype/prejudice
application occur (1) without awareness, (2) efficiently, and (3) goal-independently. We highlight evidence indicating convergence or divergence
of the automaticity components during each of the processing stages. This analysis provides readers with an up-to-date review that helps to
evaluate whether a multi-component approach to automaticity is of additional benefit in aggregating knowledge about the cognitive
antecedents of discrimination. We discuss open issues and avenues for future research.
Keywords: automaticity, categorization, stereotype/prejudice activation, stereotype/prejudice application, stereotyping
Encountering a Black person in the subway late at night
may induce feelings of threat among White people in
Europe or the USA and lead them change to another car,
whereas reactions to encountering another White person
in the same context might be more positive. Given that
one is unfamiliar with both persons, the reactions must
result from knowledge stored in memory about Black
versus White people in general. The present article is about
such differences in perceiving and judging individuals
solely because they are members of different social
categories.
In the present paper, we will review research on three
basic cognitive processes that contribute to social discrimi-
nation: categorization, stereotype/prejudice activation, and
stereotype/prejudice application. There is now substantial
evidence that these processes can operate automatically
(e.g., Devine & Sharp, 2009; Ito, 2013). However, there
are multiple components of automaticity that have not
always clearly delineated in previous work. In particular,
processes are automatic if they occur without awareness,
efficiently, unintentionally, and uncontrollably (Bargh,
1994; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Most work on the
extent to which categorization, activation, or application
occur automatically does not specify which component of
automaticity is operating in a particular context. Rather,
the general term “automaticity” is often used, regardless
of which component is being investigated. The implication
is that the different components of automaticity converge
and operate in unison. In the present paper, we directly
examine this question, systematically reviewing evidence
on the converge of different components of automaticity
during different stages of cognitive processing. We evaluate
whether a multi-component approach to automaticity is of
additional benefit in aggregating knowledge about the oper-
ating conditions of categorization, activation, and applica-
tion. We highlight open issues as well as challenges in
investigating the automaticity of these processes. Finally,
we provide readers with an analytic basis for deriving inter-
ventions to prevent stereotypes and prejudice from affect-
ing judgments and behavior.
Cognitive Antecedents
of Discrimination
Multiple cognitive, affective, and motivational processes
precede and contribute to social discrimination. Prominent
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theoretical analyses (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Macrae &
Quadflieg, 2010) propose three broad stages of cognitive
processing that may eventually cause discriminatory judg-
ment and behavior (see Figure 1).1
First in the sequence, an individual is assigned to a
category that defines a social group (e.g., the elderly,
men, Blacks; Bodenhausen, Kang, & Peery, 2012).2 Once
categorization has taken place, stereotypes and prejudice
associated with the category may be activated and become
accessible for further processing. According to typical
definitions, stereotypes contain characteristics about what
category members are like, although the possession of
these attributes is neither sufficient nor necessary to define
the category (e.g., Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998). Prejudice
is typically defined as an attitude toward social groups and
their members that can be positive or negative (e.g.,
Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). In the present
literature, activation and application of stereotypes versus
prejudice are rarely experimentally distinguished (but see
Amodio & Devine, 2006), and most work suggests that
they operate similarly in terms of the components of auto-
maticity. Once activated, stereotypes/prejudice may enter
judgment and decision-making processes and hence be
applied to social perception, judgment, and behavior. There
is, however, an important distinction between stereotype/
prejudice activation (i.e., mental accessibility) and their
application (i.e., the use of activated content during thought
and behavior).
People may try (and succeed) to inhibit any of these
processes in order to prevent discrimination as an end stage
of this cognitive cascade. For example, if the Black person
in the subway is initially not categorized as Black, it is less
likely that stereotypes/prejudice will be activated. Even if
categorization occurs, it is not necessarily the case that
stereotypes/prejudice will be activated. If stereotypes/
prejudice are not activated upon perceiving the Black
person, then they will not influence perception, judgment,
and behavior. Even if stereotypes/prejudice are activated,
they may not be applied in perception, judgment, and
behavior.
The Concept of Automaticity
In recent reviews on stereotyping/prejudice, automaticity
is often treated as a homogenous construct (e.g., Dovidio
et al., 2010) and is sometimes contrasted with the con-
trol of stereotyping/prejudice (Monteith, Woodcock, &
Gulker, 2013). However, several theoretical analyses assert
that automaticity has multiple components (Moors &
De Houwer, 2006); among them unawareness, efficiency,
unintentionality, and uncontrollability (Bargh, 1994).
Awareness broadly refers to the degree to which a person
can report that a process took place. A perceiver could be
unaware of a person being judged (e.g., in subliminal
priming research) or unaware of how features of that target
influence how they think and feel about the target.
Efficiency refers to the degree to which a process draws
on central cognitive resources and, hence, is more or less
easily undermined in the presence of competing tasks.
Thus, an efficient process occurs irrespective of other
Figure 1. Illustration of the three cognitive processing stages that may cause discrimination.
1 We acknowledge that stereotypes and prejudice toward in-groups can also become activated and applied to in-group members including the
self – with problematic consequences (e.g., Martiny, Roth, Jelenec, Steffens, & Croizet, 2012). Nearly all of the research on the distinct
antecedents of discrimination however, has focused on how automatic these processes occur with respect to out-group members. It is an
important research question on whether the same processes and their operating principles as reviewed in the present article can be generalized
to in-group members and the self.
2 Notably, some research has shown that features (e.g., shape of nose and lips) over and above category information can influence judgments,
suggesting that categorization might not be an essential cognitive process preceding discrimination (Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004). However,
evidence for stereotype/prejudice-consistent judgments that circumvent categorization has been inferred indirectly only. We are not aware of
any experiments that allow causal conclusions about whether application can completely circumvent categorization. Therefore, we acknowledge
that features may directly translate into application, but for the present review we stick with the common stage model including categorization.
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ongoing processes that draw on similar resources. Speed is
another aspect of efficiency, referring to the time needed
for execution of a process (Smith & Lerner, 1986). Inten-
tionality refers to the degree to which a process is initiated
intentionally. A process occurs unintentionally when the
goal of initiating the process is absent, but the process is still
operating. Finally, controllability refers to the degree to
which a process can be stopped or changed when a decision
is made to stop or change it. If a process cannot be
voluntarily stopped, it is said to be uncontrollable.
Some of the components of automaticity are rarely
investigated separately. This is particularly true for the dis-
tinction between intentionality and controllability, which
may be, in part, due to a lack of methods that can differen-
tiate them (see Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib,
2012). Because intentionality and controllability are both
goal-dependent, and because research has rarely distin-
guished between them, we will summarize the literature
under the conjoint term goal-dependence. A process is
goal-independent when the behavior is consistent regard-
less of whether there is a goal to initiate or stop it.
A cognitive process may operate without awareness or
goals and be efficient. Theoretically, however, these com-
ponents of automaticity can diverge. For example, some
processes are efficient but goal-dependent (e.g., steering a
car) or goal-independent but involve awareness (e.g., a
muscle reflex). Thus, evidence that a process is automatic
regarding one component of automaticity does not impli-
cate that the same process is automatic regarding a differ-
ent component of automaticity. The present review
evaluates the extent to which categorization, activation,
and application are to a similar extent processes that occur
without awareness or goals and are efficient. A detailed
analysis separating the components of automaticity will
help to clarify the nature of the cognitive processes that
nourish discrimination.
Automaticity of the Cognitive
Antecedents of Discrimination
Automatic Categorization
Awareness
At least three lines of empirical evidence indicate that parts
of the categorization process can occur without awareness.
First, evidence suggests that socially relevant categoriza-
tions are influenced by subliminal stimuli (Klauer, Eder,
Greenwald, & Abrams, 2007). A second set of experiments
has demonstrated that people sometimes are able to inten-
tionally and consciously categorize other people but have
little to no knowledge about the perceptual features they
use to come to such categorizations (Rule, Ambady, Adams,
& Macrae, 2008). Finally, people’s behavior clearly demon-
strated that they have categorized others without being
aware that they have done so (Stroessner, Haines, Sherman,
& Kantrowitz, 2010).
Speed and Efficiency
Studies that assessed the time people need to perform
gender, age, and race categorizations observed laten-
cies lower than 600 ms (e.g., Wiese, Schweinberger, &
Neumann, 2008). EEG-based measures that provide a
more fine-grained time estimate of categorization than
tasks that involve behavioral responses show that brain
potentials occurring as soon as about 200ms after stimulus
onset may differentially respond to category related fea-
tures of faces (e.g., Tomelleri & Castelli, 2012).
Experiments that rendered the categorization process
more demanding (e.g., by making faces harder to process)
have demonstrated that categories are still extracted indi-
cating its efficiency (Macrae, Quinn, Mason, & Quadflieg,
2005; Martin & Macrae, 2010). A second strategy has
shown that categorization occurs even when participants’
cognitive resources are taxed by a secondary task (Klauer
& Ehrenberg, 2005).
Goal-Dependence
Research based on several methods suggests that catego-
rization occurs independently from perceiver goals. In the
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), distracter stimuli
(e.g., male or female faces) that surround target stimuli
(e.g., male or female faces) influence the speed and effi-
ciency of target-categorizations (e.g., according to gender)
despite the fact that participants are instructed to ignore
the distracter stimuli (Dickter & Bartholow, 2007). Comple-
menting these observations, evidence suggests that, once a
goal to categorize along a certain dimension (e.g., gender) is
set for a focal stimulus (e.g., a word in the center of the
screen), the category memberships of irrelevant distractor
stimuli seem still to be extracted (Macrae et al., 2005;
Mason, Cloutier, & Macrae, 2006).
During the who-said-what task (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, &
Ruderman, 1978) people are presented with statements
along with the speaker’s photographs that vary in category
membership. Afterwards they are asked to assign each
statement to the person who made it. Despite the fact that
many of the studies in this research tradition draw partici-
pants’ attention to categories (e.g., by including content
related to group issues) which may prompt categorization,
the goal to use these categories does not help completing
the task. Still, people usually make more within-category
errors (e.g., a statement by a Black person is assigned to
another Black person) than between-category errors
(a statement by a Black person is assigned to a White
2018 Hogrefe Publishing European Psychologist (2018)
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person) indicating that at least salient categories affect
categorization goal-independently.
Once a face is intentionally categorized (e.g., as male),
then performing the same categorization again typically is
faster than performing another categorization (e.g., young)
– a phenomenon known as repetition priming (Burton,
Bruce, & Johnston, 1990). Evidence suggests that repetition
priming occurs even for categorizations that were not
intended initially (e.g., the social categorization young is
also facilitated by a previous male categorization), providing
indirect evidence that the unintended categorization
previously occurred in parallel along with the intended
categorization (Wiese et al., 2008).
A number of studies have observed differential event-
related potentials (ERP) reflecting categorization (Ito,
Thompson, & Cacioppo, 2004; Wiese et al., 2008) that
are independent of goals to categorize targets along the
critical dimension. Such differential effects even occurred
when participants viewed the faces in the background while
scanning the screen for simple objects such as white dots
(Ito & Urland, 2005; Tomelleri & Castelli, 2012).
Findings like these provide evidence for the notion that,
independent of goals, categories are extracted and affect
information processing. However, there also is some con-
tradictory evidence. For example, Quinn and Macrae
(2005) failed to observe repetition priming of unintended
categories, and Ofan, Rubin, and Amodio (2011) failed to
observe differential effects in ERP as a function of the race
of target faces. Furthermore, recent research indicates that
competing categories can reduce the use of the initial cate-
gory, particularly when observers intend comparative judg-
ments between the cued categories (Klauer, Hölzenbein,
Calanchini, & Sherman, 2014). Thus, although, categories
can be extracted independent of goals, in some situations,
goals modify categorization (also see Pietraszewski, 2016).
Automatic Activation of
Stereotypes/Prejudice
Awareness
There is abundant evidence that category primes (e.g., faces
of group members or category labels) presented sublimi-
nally influence prejudice/stereotype activation (e.g.,
Degner, Wentura, Gniewosz, & Noack, 2007; Perdue &
Gurtman, 1990). For example, Moskowitz, Stone, and
Childs (2012) presented people with category primes (faces
of African and European men) for as short as 10 ms. While
no subjects reported having seen any face, responses to
stereotypical words were faster following the stereotyped
group primes than responses to the same words follow-
ing non-stereotyped group primes. Furthermore, neuro-
scientific evidence complements the conclusion that
stereotypes/prejudice can become activated without aware-
ness (Cunningham et al., 2004).
Speed and Efficiency
Activation is often inferred from reaction-time-based
implicit measures that involve behavioral responses.
Results from these measures show that stereotypes/
prejudice are often activated in less than a second (e.g., Blair
& Banaji, 1996; Payne, 2001). Studies drawing on more
fine-grained time-resolved EEG responses toward social
stimuli indicate that category-based affective reactions
occur by about 400–500 ms after stimulus onset (Ito et al.,
2004; Wang et al., 2011; White, Crites, Taylor, & Corral,
2009). Research on expectancy violation indicates that
stereotypes/prejudice are activated as early as about
300 ms (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006) or even
100 ms after stimulus presentation (Dickter & Gyurovski,
2012).
Strong evidence for the efficiency of stereotype activation
has been provided by research employing the weapon
identification task (WIT). During theWIT, people see a face
of a Black or a White person followed by a weapon or a tool
(Payne, 2001). Their task is simply to identify the object as
either a weapon or a tool. Usually, people are faster to
identify a weapon when preceded by a Black face than
when preceded by a White face. When researchers added
time pressure to the decisions in the WIT, results show that
(1) parameters of stereotype activation were not affected
(Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002) and (2) stereotype-
consistent responses increased (Payne, 2001). Finally,
Govorun and Payne (2006) depleted participant’s cognitive
resources before performing the WIT and showed that
stereotype-consistent judgments persisted, nevertheless,
indicating that activation is not resource-dependent.
Contradicting this evidence, a few studies suggest stereo-
type activation to be inefficient. In Gilbert and Hixon’s
study (1991) participants watched a videotape showing a
White or an Asian assistant. Results demonstrated that only
participants who were not distracted by a second task
while watching the video showed stereotype activation. Dis-
tracted participants in that experiment did not show activa-
tion (also see Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998).
Goal-Dependence
If results of implicit measures that assess activation could
not be altered or faked, this would speak to the goal-
independence of activation. However, research shows that
responses on implicit measures are sometimes susceptible
to faking. Similarly, a variety of motives and goals can affect
activation. One line of research suggests that a self-esteem
maintenance goal enhanced stereotype activation even
under circumstances in which stereotypes were not acti-
vated (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999; Spencer et al., 1998).
European Psychologist (2018) 2018 Hogrefe Publishing
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More research has focused on goals that may counteract
activation. Research distinguishes two variants of anti-
prejudice or egalitarian motives. People can either be moti-
vated to avoid prejudice because their social environment
encourages them to do so (i.e., external motivation) or
because they truly endorse and enact egalitarian goals,
independent from what others think (i.e., internal motiva-
tion; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998).
Evidence based on physiological responses (Amodio,
Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008) as well as process dissoci-
ation methods (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, Allen, Klauer, &
Amodio, 2011) suggest that people with high internal but
low external motivation to control prejudice exhibit mark-
edly reduced activation compared to other combinations
of internal/external motivation of control (also see Devine,
Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Fehr &
Sassenberg, 2010). Similarly, Moskowitz and colleagues’
research suggests that chronic as well as temporarily
activated egalitarian goals inhibit activation (Moskowitz,
Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz & Li, 2011).
Research that induced participants to have concurrent
goals has shown diverse results. In line with the literature
reviewed above, some studies indicate that instructed
dissenting-goals reduce or even eliminate activation (Kunda
& Spencer, 2003). For example, in Jones and Fazio’s study
(2010), race-related stereotypes in the WIT were only
activated when participants attended to race but not when
they were instructed to attend to age instead of race (also
see Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli,
1997). Comparable results occurred for prejudice activation
when people intended an individuating judgment (whether
the person likes vegetables) or when people were merely
searching for a dot in the presented face (Wheeler & Fiske,
2005). However, other research that instructed dissent-
ing goals similarly has shown that activation is invariant
upon them. Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel, and Deutsch
(2010) instructed participants to either attend to the age
or to the ethnicity of target persons that were presented
as primes in the affective misattribution procedure
(AMP), another implicit measure of bias (Payne, Cheng,
Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Results indicated that prejudice
was activated irrespectively of attentional focus, pointing at
the goal-independence of activation. Instructing people
differently, Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby (2002) observed
similar results in the WIT: stereotype activation was
invariant across instructions to ignore or to use the category
for judgment (also see Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt,
Dierksmeier, & Banse, 2011; Payne et al., 2005 for similar
findings of these instructions using the AMP).
Finally results derived from the primed lexical decision
task (LDT; e.g., Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000) provide evi-
dence for goal-independent stereotype activation. In the
LDT, participants are instructed to merely distinguish
words from non-words by means of a key-press after having
been primed with a category stimulus. The prime stimuli
are introduced as irrelevant or even presented subliminally
(e.g., Hutter & Crisp, 2008). Still, primes affected the time
with which targets were classified as words or non-words.
However, temporarily activated egalitarian goals may coun-
teract activation in the LDT and, thus, under conditions
that usually are invariant to goals (Moskowitz & Li, 2011).
Automatic Application of Stereotypes/
Prejudice
Awareness
Research consistently has shown that stereotype/prejudice
application can bypass awareness. For example, Graham
and Lowery (2004) subliminally primed police officers with
words related to Black people. Afterwards, they were pre-
sented with scenarios about a hypothetical adolescent
who committed a crime. The scenario did not contain
any information about the category membership of the
adolescent. Nevertheless, the officers rated the adolescent
more negatively, judged him more culpable, and even
recommended a stronger punishment when primed with
words indicating the category of Blacks than when primed
with neutral words (also see Gross & Hardin, 2007).
Besides judgments, studies indicated that subliminally
priming people with category information led to stereo-
type-consistent subsequent behavior (e.g., Chen & Bargh,
1997), though recent replication attempts call into question
the robustness of such effects (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, &
Cleeremans, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013; but see Payne,
Brown-Iannuzzi, & Loersch, 2016 for an explanation).
In other research, participants were primed with clearly
perceivable stimuli that influenced their judgments about
stereotypic and counter-stereotypic traits of a category
member but they could not tell about the influence of the
prime on their judgments (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977).
These studies imply that activated stereotypes can lead to
stereotype congruent judgments even when participants
retrospectively indicate that they were not aware of the
influence of the priming (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993).
Speed and Efficiency
Research that implemented the shooter task has shown that
the decision to shoot is faster when a weapon is presented
with a Black person compared to a White person. People
showed behavioral responses that reflect stereotype appli-
cation in this simple judgmental task about 550 ms after
the onset of a category exemplar (e.g., shoot response after
seeing a Black person holding a gun; Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2002; Correll et al., 2007; for a recent
conceptual replication see Essien et al., 2017). ERPs that
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may go along with ascribing a stereotypical versus a non-
stereotypical trait to a respective category differ at
180–200 and 300–350 ms after activation (Jia et al.,
2012). The behavioral responses that indicate stereotype
application in that task took about 400 ms after activation.
Ample evidence suggests that stereotype/prejudice appli-
cation is efficient in that it occurs under time pressure and
with restricted cognitive resources. This is at least the case
when the situation is ambiguous (e.g., Kleider, Knuycky, &
Cavrak, 2012) or when there is a semantic fit between
activated memory content and the target’s characteristics
(e.g., Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005). Once stereotypes are
activated, time pressure and cognitive constraints (e.g.,
distracting tasks, physical depletion, anxiety arousal) during
the impression formation or the application phase increase
stereotype/prejudice-consistent perceptions and judgments
(e.g., Blair, Judd, & Fallman, 2004; Macrae, Hewstone, &
Griffiths, 1993; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van
Knippenberg, 2004). Further indication that stereotypes
affect judgment and behavior under time pressure can be
found in research using the shooter task. In line with results
on stereotype activation that implemented the WIT, adding
time pressure in the shooter task pushes the stereotype-
consistent reaction time effect into false stereotype-
consistent responses (Correll et al., 2002).
Goal-Dependence
Similar to the evidence on goal-dependent activation,
people may want to either increase or reduce the influence
of stereotypes/prejudice in their judgments and behavior.
If none of these motives affect application, this indi-
cates that application is goal-independent. However, self-
enhancement goals intensified prejudice-consistent
judgments of out-group members (Fein & Spencer, 1997;
Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005).
Most of the research has focused on the reduction of
stereotype/prejudice application. People who were moti-
vated to respond without prejudice (Devine et al., 2002;
Dunton & Fazio, 1997), those who were prompted to form
an accurate impression of an individual (e.g., Kruglanski &
Freund, 1983; Pendry & Macrae, 1994), and those who
were instructed to willingly suppress the influence of
stereotypes/prejudice in their judgments (Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wyer, 2007) were
able to reduce their expression of stereotypes/prejudice
(also see Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012 for goal-dependent
stereotype application after activation). Thus, abundant
evidence shows that application does not meet the
automaticity criterion of goal-independence (but see
Blair et al., 2004 for goal-independence of feature-based
stereotyping).
However, research has revealed important boundary
conditions for goals to reduce application. People were only
able to control the influence of stereotypes/prejudice in
their judgments when they had time and sufficient process-
ing capacity to implement their goal (Pendry & Macrae,
1994). Research employing the shooter task underlines that
motivated counteracting of application depends on cogni-
tive resources: despite being rewarded monetarily for
correct judgments in the task, when people were pressed
for time, their stereotype-consistent errors increased, indi-
cating that time pressure amplified stereotype application
irrespective of goals (Correll et al., 2002). Finally, research
indicates that when people willingly suppressed the influ-
ence of stereotypes while describing a person, stereotypes
became hyper-accessible and were strongly applied there-
after (e.g., Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2007; Macrae et al.,
1994; Wyer, Sherman, & Stroessner, 1998). This was
particularly true for individuals high in prejudice who were
not internally motivated to respond without prejudice
(Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998).
Notably, Glaser and colleagues have argued that goals
and motives can operate outside of awareness and con-
scious control (Glaser & Kihlstrom, 2005). They employed
reaction-time-based methods (e.g., IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to assess two antecedents
(implicit negative attitude toward prejudice, implicit belief
that oneself is prejudiced) of what they call implicit motiva-
tion to control prejudice. Their research revealed that
people high in implicit motivation to control prejudice
(those who show at the same time high levels of implicit
negative attitude toward prejudice and belief that oneself
is prejudiced) showed less application of stereotypes the
stronger their implicit stereotype was (Glaser & Knowles,
2008). Furthermore, people high in implicit motivation to
control prejudice also showed decreased application when
their cognitive resources were depleted (Park, Glaser, &
Knowles, 2008). This research suggests that people high
in implicit motivation to control prejudice show reduced
application in an efficient manner. Together with the above
reviewed evidence, these findings are interesting because
they suggest that different kinds of goals and motivations
distinctly affect application more or less depending on cog-
nitive capacity. Whereas instructed goals appear to depend
on cognitive resources, goals that are represented in the
associative knowledge structure counteract application effi-
ciently. Even though Glaser and colleagues suggest that
implicit motivation to control prejudice operates outside
of awareness and consciousness, that claim has not yet
been investigated. Research showed that people are well
aware of their implicit attitudes and can willingly control
responses on the IAT and similar tasks (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh,
& Blair, 2014; Steffens, 2004). Thus, it is an important
avenue for future research to investigate whether motiva-
tion can alter stereotype/prejudice application not only effi-
ciently but also without awareness and conscious intent.
European Psychologist (2018) 2018 Hogrefe Publishing
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Summary
An extensive body of research has investigated the auto-
maticity of cognitive antecedents of discrimination.
We began the present review with the question of whether
categorization, stereotype/prejudice activation, and their
application in judgments and behavior can occur without
awareness, efficiently, and goal-independently. Certainly,
a single true positive result for each of the processing stages
would already establish that it occurs in principle without
awareness, efficiently, and goal-independently. However,
a single positive result could also represent a false-positive
finding. Therefore, in the following section, we aim to high-
light where there are inconsistent findings in the literature
tackling the question whether – based on the published
body of evidence – the cognitive processes typically are
automatic. Table 1 summarizes the results of this review.
Notably, this summary cannot be a “proof of existence”
it merely demonstrates inconsistencies in the published
literature that we aim to highlight. A more conclusive
answer to the question about whether these processes
typically occur automatically needs a quantitative approach
systematically analyzing published as well as unpublished
research. Such a comprehensive meta-analysis is still
missing from the literature. Given that our review revealed
some inconsistencies in the literature, a quantitative
approach would be a promising avenue for the research
on the automaticity of the cognitive antecedents of
discrimination.
Reviewing the literature, we observed that findings con-
verge with respect to the automaticity dimensions (un)
awareness and efficiency. All three processing stages have
been consistently shown to occur without awareness, in less
than one second, and independently of cognitive resources.
Notably, an often cited study demonstrated that stereotypes
are not activated when people are distracted by a secondary
task (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). However, in sum there is con-
siderable evidence demonstrating the opposite; stereotype/
prejudice activation is unaffected when people are dis-
tracted or under time pressure. Therefore, we conclude that
the published evidence for efficient activation is consistent,
with that exception.
Research also indicates that categorization, activation,
and application operate independently from goals. How-
ever, there is also evidence that motives and goals alter
all of these processes. Thus, the evidence on goal-(in)
dependence is the most inconclusive, and more systematic
investigation of boundary conditions is warranted.
At least some of the inconsistencies may be accounted
for by what is known about how goals affect performance
(Locke & Latham, 1990). Among the main moderators
specified by goal-setting theory (Locke, 2015) are task com-
plexity, feedback (knowledge of progress), goal commit-
ment, and situational constraints. Drawing on goal-setting
theory, some of the contradictory findings, for example,
on goal-(in)dependence of stereotype/prejudice activation
may be explained by differences in the employed tasks.
For example, whereas dissenting categorization instructions
altered activation in the WIT, they did not have such an
effect on AMP performance. Even though both are priming
measures, the tasks are very different: recognizing an object
as a tool or gun (WIT) versus evaluating a neutral stimulus
(AMP). Additionally, procedural differences of tasks (e.g.,
different stimulus onset asynchronies, time pressure,
feedback on the correctness of responses) may have
contributed to diverging findings in previous research
(Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009).
Goal commitment may be another crucial moderator
explaining when goals affect categorization, activation, and
application. Research showed that internal motivation to
avoid stereotyping aswell as intrinsic egalitarian goals dimin-
ish stereotype/prejudice activation. Instructed goals, how-
ever, were less consistently effective. There is reason to
assume that people are, in general, more committed to pur-
sue intrinsic goals than goals that are extrinsically provided
(Latham, Erez, & Locke, 1988). These differences in goal
commitment may distinctly affect effort and persis-
tence while performing a task and, thereby, explain inconsis-
tencies among studies that have investigated the influence
of goals on categorization, activation, and application.
Table 1. Summary of published evidence that the three cognitive processing stages occur without awareness, are fast, efficient, and goal-
independent
Processing Stage
Categorization Stereotype/prejudice activation Stereotype/prejudice application
Automaticity component
Unaware Consistent evidence Consistent evidence Consistent evidence
Speeded EEG responses 200–600 ms,
behavioral responses < 600 ms
EEG responses 100–500 ms,
behavioral responses < 1 s
EEG responses 180–350 ms,
behavioral responses 400–550 ms
Efficient Consistent evidence Consistent evidence, except
of two experiments
Consistent evidence
Goal-independent Mixed evidence Mixed evidence Mixed evidence
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Whereas goal-setting theory aims to explain performance
based on conscious goals, an even more interesting case is
goals that may operate unconsciously (Glaser & Knowles,
2008; Moskowitz et al., 1999). Despite widespread
evidence that goals alter stereotype/prejudice activation
and application only when cognitive resources are plentiful,
time pressure is absent, and people consciously perceive
cues (e.g., Bartholow, Henry, Lust, Saults, & Wood, 2012;
Lambert et al., 2003; Lepore & Brown, 2002), some
evidence suggests that egalitarian goals and implicit moti-
vation can reduce activation and application even under
time pressure (Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000),
when cognitive resources are depleted (Park et al., 2008),
and when the target person is not consciously perceived
(Johns, Cullum, Smith, & Freng, 2008). Together, the
results suggest that distinct goal representations operate
under different conditions. Whereas less intrinsic goals
may draw on cognitive resources and require awareness,
more intrinsic goals may be activated and inhibit activation
and application effortlessly and without awareness (also see
Huntsinger, Sinclair, Kenrick, & Ray, 2016 for another
example). More systematic research is needed to address
what kinds of goals operate under which conditions.
Conclusion
Avoiding stereotyping and prejudice in judgments and
behavior can be difficult and, in some situations, even
impossible because processes that nourish biased responses
proceed automatically. The present review highlighted the
importance of distinguishing among components of auto-
maticity in research on the cognitive antecedents of dis-
crimination. Despite the immense volume of literature on
the automaticity of categorization, activation, application,
the present systematic overview highlights that components
of automaticity may diverge across and even interactively
influence these processes.
We believe that there should be more systematic
research specifically on how components of automaticity
interact in affecting categorization, activation, and applica-
tion. We want to conclude with what we have identified as
avenues for future research toward this goal. First, research
needs to address differences in goal commitment when
investigating the effects of goals on categorization, activa-
tion, and application. Second, cognitive representations of
distinct types of goals (e.g., intrinsic, extrinsic) may differ.
A taxonomy of goals that have been investigated in
categorization, activation, and application that highlights
differences and similarities among goals would be a useful
first step. Furthermore, a variety of methods have been
employed to tackle people’s cognitive resources. Whereas
some of these methods distract attention by various means,
other methods add time pressure. A better understanding
of how distinct goals affect responding requires a more
systematic study of different means of constraining process-
ing resources. Similarly, the cognitive antecedents of
discrimination have been investigated with a variety of dis-
tinct tasks. As tasks vary along an unspecified number of
criteria (e.g., complexity, behavioral response, stimulus
onset asynchrony), a systematic examination of these tasks
and features would be most welcome. Finally, researchers
should be explicit about which component of automaticity
they are investigating and about the conditions under which
the implemented tasks operate. In conclusion, despite the
immense body of literature on the automaticity of cognitive
antecedents of discrimination, research has just begun to
put together the pieces of the puzzle.
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